

**Insanity: Doing the Same Thing Over and Over Again and Expecting Different Results –
Globalization Losers' Switch from Left Parties to Populist Radical Right Parties**

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Insanity: Doing the Same Thing Over and Over Again and Expecting Different Results – Globalization Losers’ Switch from Left Parties to Populist Radical Right Parties

In many established democracies populist radical right (PRR) parties have been on the rise over the last decades (Rooduijn et al., 2024). Scholars have sought to understand who votes for these parties and why they do so. Particularly surprising seem the working-class people who are increasingly voting for PRR parties, loosening their traditional alliance with left-wing parties. Many explanations for this development already exist, and they often point to cultural or economic factors (Guiso et al., 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). What has only received limited attention in the literature is the role of globalization (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b; Flaherty & Rogowski, 2021; Milner, 2021). These scholars argue that the economic losers of globalization do not trust left parties anymore to compensate them for their losses and thus they seek new political answers. PRR parties offer a solution that can be subsumed under ‘economic nationalism’ (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b). The concept refers to a mixture of protectionism, anti-elite rhetoric, and opposition to immigration. Yet these arguments contrast with the long-held belief that globalization losers seek more social protection by voting for left parties (Walter, 2010). This opens the question this paper seeks to investigate: Who do globalization losers vote for?

The existing literature on this topic has not looked at the individual level yet. Nonetheless, this is of particular importance as the causal explanations behind the association between trade shocks and the vote share of PRR parties that is often identified are located at the individual level. I define the effect of globalization on the individual as the intersection of their job’s offshorability and their skill level. In addition to using standard regression analysis, I construct matched datasets to strengthen the causal interpretation of my findings. The results support the notion that globalization losers are more likely to vote for PRR parties and that they hold more negative views of immigration, which can be seen as a confirmation of the ‘economic nationalism’ explanation, at least to some extent.

The following section details the existing arguments about why globalization losers are likely to vote for left parties. Next, I define who loses and who wins from globalization, based on previous literature, and then examine existing arguments about why losers might turn to PRR parties in recent years, before formulating my expectations. I then operationalize the main variables of my analysis and detail the exact models I am using, before presenting the results of my analysis. Lastly, I discuss my findings and give an outlook for future research.

The compensation argument

The large body of literature that has looked at the question of how globalization affects welfare states has not come to a definite conclusion. Conversely, different schools of thought have emerged that offer different answers. While some scholars argue that globalization has no effect (Iversen & Cusack, 2000; Plümpert et al., 2005), two main ideas have emerged. One argues that globalization negatively affects the development of welfare states. It is argued that openness to trade reduces social spending as governments are pressured to do so by business interests and because workers lack the collective bargaining power to counter these attacks on the welfare state (Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra, 2002). These arguments often stem from developments in emerging economies from Latin America but do extend to OECD nations as well (Busemeyer, 2009).

Yet, the most prominent school of thought regarding the relationship between globalization and welfare argues that increases in trade and other forms of globalization lead to an expansion of social protection. The so-called compensation hypothesis draws upon the concept of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982), which builds upon the observation that increased openness to trade is correlated with more social spending (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1998). According to this line of thinking a bargain was struck for generous redistribution and insurance in turn for support for the globalization of the economy in Western Democracies after 1945 (Hwang & Lee, 2014; Katzenstein, 1985).

While earlier literature focused on the macro-level relationship between globalization and welfare policy the focus has shifted to the individual level in recent years. This provides an important micro foundation for the existing macro-level work by looking at the effect of globalization on individuals' attitudes about redistribution and vote choice. The main driver behind an individual's position on redistribution and ultimately their vote choice is their position in the global economy. This position influences perceptions of economic insecurity as globalization arguably increases voters' economic risk. Globalization divides people into those who benefit from it and those who suffer losses from it (Rehm, 2009; Rommel & Walter, 2018; Walter, 2010). How globalization divides people into winners and losers will be discussed in a later section. At this point, it is enough to note that losers face a higher risk of receiving lower wages or losing their job which means they are more negatively affected by globalization and thus they feel more economically insecure than winners.

Building upon ideas from the social insurance literature (Moene & Wallerstein, 2001), it is assumed that globalization losers with greater economic uncertainty tend to be more strongly in favor of expanded welfare state provisions and redistribution (Rehm, 2009; Walter, 2010), because welfare programs are understood as insurance against economic misfortunes. Yet, only having

these demands is not enough because they need to be voiced effectively in the political arena so that they can result in policy change. The most fruitful avenue for success is to support those parties that have similar preferences and are thus most likely to pursue them should they get into government (Rehm, 2009; Walter, 2010). Following the compensation hypothesis globalization losers should thus be more prone to supporting left parties as they are known for favoring welfare state expansion and redistribution (Rommel & Walter, 2018).

Winners and Losers

This of course begs the question of who loses from globalization and who wins. Earlier political economy literature relied on two macroeconomic models to describe the distributional effects of globalization. One of those differentiates between tradable and sheltered industries or sectors and argues that only the former are exposed to globalization (Hays, 2009), the other model focuses on the comparative advantage of high-skilled labor in advanced economies and sees them as winners while low-skilled labor loses from globalization (Rogowski, 1989). Newer arguments combine these perspectives to argue that whether someone is positively or negatively affected by globalization depends on the combination of their sector of employment and their skill level (Walter, 2010).

But there are arguments for an even more fine-grained distinction as scholars have argued that one's occupation determines redistribution preferences and not one's sector of employment (Rehm, 2009). This is because an involuntary switch between industries is not as costly as an involuntary switch between occupations as skill investments are always made based on one's occupational profile. One measure of globalization at the individual level or to be more precise, exposure to the risks and opportunities of globalization, is the offshorability of jobs. The offshoring of jobs is one of the most salient aspects of globalization and is defined as the migration of employment from one country to another (Blinder, 2007). In the wake of ongoing technological change, firms are now not only able to move manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries but also jobs in the service sector (Jensen & Kletzer, 2010), meaning white-collar workers, who traditionally had been more sheltered from the negative consequences of globalization are now also exposed to them. In recent years, more and more workers have been affected by offshoring and it has become one of the most politicized issues in the public discourse on globalization (Mankiw & Swagel, 2006; Owen, 2017).

While the public and scholarly debate often focuses on the negative aspects of offshoring its distributive effects are arguably different for different groups of workers (Rommel & Walter, 2018). In advanced economies, low-skilled workers in routine jobs will feel the strongest pressure

of offshorability as their jobs are most likely to be moved abroad and their wages might be depressed as the supply of workers in their occupations increases (Hummels et al., 2014). Conversely, offshoring also allows workers to sell their services to foreign firms (i.e. onshoring), which increases the demand for them. It is argued that the effects of globalization (through offshoring) vary by an individual's skill level. The biggest losers are low-skilled workers in highly offshorable jobs, while the biggest winners are high-skilled workers in highly offshorable jobs. Those in more sheltered occupations are a kind of intermediate category as low-skilled workers in these jobs won't be as bad off as their counterparts in offshorable occupations, while high-skilled workers won't benefit as much as their counterparts in offshorable jobs (Rommel & Walter, 2018).

Who do losers vote for

The idea that globalization-induced economic uncertainty leads to more demand for social welfare and protection was generally accepted in the literature for some time. However, scholars have started paying more attention to the objections voiced by those who highlight the constraints that globalization dynamics enforce on domestic governments, preventing them from expanding welfare provisions. Rodrik (1997) already recognized this fundamental tension and predicted that it could lead to a populist backlash. Only recently has this perspective been picked up again by researchers as they have sought to understand why working-class citizens cast their vote for PRR parties (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b, 2018a; Dippel et al., 2015; Milner, 2021; Powers & Rathbun, 2023; Rodrik, 2018), and the demise of social democratic parties all over Europe (Bandau, 2023).

Capital owners and international investors gained, thanks to the liberalization of trade and financial investments, a credible exit option in the wake of unfavorable policy instruments. This makes traditional social democratic policies, such as progressive taxation or public demand management harder to implement, relegating social democratic parties to supply-side policies or even austerity (Bandau, 2023). This means left parties cannot keep up the compensation side of the 'embedded liberalism' bargain. In line with this, Horn (2021) shows that left parties suffer considerably – and permanently – from entrenchment policies they enact. If left parties are not a viable option for globalization losers anymore then the question arises who should they vote for? While many turn to not voting (Guiso et al., 2017) the focus here lies on those that still do as they remain a politically important group.

I argue that globalization losers increasingly turn to PRR parties. Some scholars point toward cultural explanations of why those suffering economic downturns vote for PRR parties (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). These build upon the idea that a new cleavage has formed between modernization losers and winners (Kriesi, 2010, 2014). The latter representing new multicultural

values, while the former hold more traditional ones (Bornschieer, 2010). PRR parties are often deemed to have been exceptionally successful in aligning to this new cleavage by formulating ideological packages attractive to the losers of cultural diversity and economic integration (Decker, 2004).

Arguably, also economic explanations play an important role in vote choices for PRR parties, either next to cultural factors or as drivers of those. Namely, because the winners and losers of globalization seem to overlap closely with the cultural cleavage. Gidron and Hall (2017) argue that economic downturns bring about insecurity for parts of the population which shifts the cultural frameworks that people use to interpret society and their place within it. This is substantiated by the fact that the economically underprivileged tend to feel culturally distant from societies' dominant groups in an oppositional way. These feelings can be exploited by PRR parties that employ a rhetoric of the people against the elites (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). Similarly, Ballard-Rosa et al. (2017) find that negative economic shocks cause an increased adoption of authoritarian values which fosters support for right-wing parties. Overall, there seem to be multiple psychological pathways that explain the relationship between economic insecurity and voting for PRR parties, encompassing both cultural and economic factors.

Colantone and Stanig (2018a, 2018b) offer a sort of synthesis of these ideas in their concept of 'economic nationalism' as the ideological policy platform PRR parties offer. They argue that these parties often propose policies that bundle domestic free market ideas with strong protectionist stances. Here protectionism is a substitute for the social welfare compensation offered in the 'embedded liberalism' bargain for voters who do not see redistribution promises as credible anymore. This also allows these parties to propose cuts to welfare programs, at least in a chauvinistic fashion where access to welfare is restricted to members of an ethno-racially defined community. In turn, they can also promise lower taxes which is appealing to more middle-class voters and to the increasing number of people who see the welfare state as inefficient (Roosma et al., 2013). These policy promises are usually held together by so-called master narratives of authoritarian nationalism and national self-sufficiency (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b). In Europe, these narratives also usually encompass a targeting of foreigners and minorities as a way to explain why economic downturns are happening and who is at fault (Rodrik, 2018).

In light of this, globalization losers voting for PRR parties can be understood in three different ways (Colantone & Stanig, 2018a). For one, it can be seen as a vote against elites. With economic downturns, voters will feel the pressure to vote against the incumbent government and established parties. This is closely related to 'blind retrospective voting' (Achen & Bartels, 2017), meaning people do not need to identify that globalization caused their economic uncertainty and

it does not matter whether the incumbent government is responsible and whether the PRR parties offer a working solution. The vote for these parties is just a way to signal their dissatisfaction. Secondly, voting for PRR parties can be seen as a vote against the international integration of economies and for national sovereignty. This is the case when voters do identify globalization as the main cause of their economic problems, and they don't trust compensation promises anymore so they turn to the protectionism promised by PRR parties.

And third, a vote for these parties can often be understood as a vote against immigration, because they employ narratives targeting minorities. There are multiple explanations for how economic decline can intensify concerns about immigration (Colantone & Stanig, 2018a). Workers might hold a 'lump-of-labor' belief where the labor market is assumed to be a zero-sum game, meaning if someone wants a job they have to take it from someone else (Kemmerling, 2016). Thus, workers who experience a lack of employment opportunities might feel the need to protect themselves from greater competition by immigrants. It might also be the case of scapegoating, where immigrants are simply blamed for increased unemployment. In relation to chauvinist welfare ideas an increased reliance on welfare programs might also foster fears of overcrowding and congestion in social security programs due to immigration.

Taking all the points from the existing literature and applying them to globalization losers my main expectation is that they will vote for PRR parties in a greater magnitude than globalization winners.

H1: Globalization losers are more likely to vote for PRR parties than globalization winners.

In line with the arguments subsumed under economic nationalism, it seems reasonable to expect that negative views of immigration are more common among globalization losers. While it would have been interesting to test other propositions from this line of thought, such as their preference for protectionism rather than social welfare programs, I cannot do so due to a lack of accessible data.

H2: Globalization losers have a more negative view of immigration than globalization winners.

Research Design

To test the two hypotheses, I need to assess the effect globalization has on a person at the individual level. As mentioned, the effect of globalization is conceptualized through the intersection of a person's skill-level and the offshorability of their job. The information on their skill-level is taken from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2018, 2023f, 2023e, 2023d, 2023c, 2023b,

2023a) which classifies respondents into one of the seven categories of the ISCED¹ classification. This provides a good proxy measure for an individual's skill level, even if some skills might be acquired later in life. The ESS also includes information on the respondents' occupations in the form of ISCO-08² and ISCO-88³ codes. To assess the offshorability of a job I rely on an index created by Blinder (2007) that evaluates whether the service a job provides can be delivered over a large distance with little to no loss of quality. The measure has been used widely in the literature, even to assess globalization's impact on voting (Rommel & Walter, 2018). Jobs are graded on a scale from 0 to 100. I use a version of the index crosswalked to the ISCO classification from the original SOC-10⁴ version (Kaihovaara & Im, 2020) to match it to ESS occupation data. In line with the arguments in the previous section, I create a variable 'Globalization Score' that runs from 1 to 4 with the outright losers taking the value 1, those less negatively affected taking the value 2, those slightly positively affected taking the value 3, and the outright winners taking the value 4. The division on the offshorability scale is in the exact middle (value: 50) and for education, I differentiate between those who have a university degree and those who do not. I also create a binary variable 'Globalization Loser 1' that groups those with a score of 1 and 2 as losers, and those with a score of 3 and 4 as winners. To get an even clearer distinction I create a second binary variable 'Globalization Loser 2' that only classifies those with a score of 1 as losers, and those with a score of 4 as winners and discards the rest.

The dependent variables are also operationalized using the ESS. To identify those respondents who voted for PRR parties I rely on variables in the ESS that denote who the person voted for in the last election. I take this information and match it to the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2024), a database that identifies parties as populist and whether they are right or left populists. This allows me to create a binary variable taking the value 1 when someone voted for a PRR party. To assess the views respondents have about immigration multiple variables in the ESS exist. I rely on one that asks whether the country is "made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?" This seems to be the broadest question posed in the ESS. It ranges from 0 (the country is made worse) to 10 (the country is made better).

I rely on several control variables that have been identified in the literature as affecting people's response to globalization. All are taken from the ESS. They include their income, their parent's highest level of education, their position on a left-right scale, and their satisfaction with the economy, as well as the RTI (Routine Task Intensity) index which denotes how routinized the

¹ International Standard Classification of Education

² International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008

³ International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988

⁴ 2010 Standard Occupational Classification

tasks in their jobs are. I also include socio-demographic controls such as gender, age, country of residence, and the year when the survey was conducted. I include responses from 16 countries⁵ that can be seen as advanced economies as the theoretical reasoning behind who is a globalization winner and loser relies on that. Due to the availability of variables included in the analysis I rely on ESS rounds 4 to 10, corresponding to the years 2008 and 2020.

In line with most of the literature in political science, I start by specifying regression models. To test the first hypothesis which looks at the effect of globalization on the vote choice for PRR parties I specify a standard logistic regression model as the dependent variable is binary. I control for individual-level factors that might influence how someone is affected by globalization and who they vote for with the variables mentioned above. Additionally, I specify two-way fixed effects accounting for the country of the respondent and the time when the survey was fielded. This is useful as it is highly conceivable that there are systematic differences in how globalization influences people and how successful PRR parties are between countries and over time. Using two-way fixed effects, I can account for the multilevel structure of the data and control for all variables that do not change over time and within countries. I use the same control variables and two-way fixed effects when testing the second hypothesis. As the dependent variable is not binary anymore, I rely on OLS (ordinary least squares) regression. In both models, I rely on the ‘Globalization Score’ as the independent variable. As a robustness check, I also specify the models with the binary ‘Globalization Loser 2’ variable as the independent one, but results remain essentially the same. They are presented in the Appendix.

While the regression tests are a first indication of whether the proposed relationship between the variables exists the problem with using regression as the main strategy is that it makes robust causal analyses almost impossible. For regression to be interpreted causally one would need to control for all variables that might connect the main independent and dependent variables. With complex social decisions such as voting this is virtually impossible. Thus, one can never be sure with regression that the estimated effect is the true causal estimate. While ideally, one would conduct an experiment to assess the causal effect, this is of course not possible with the variables that are analyzed here. Fortunately, different methods exist that allow researchers to approximate experimental setups with observational data. I make use of matching, a method that is increasingly common in political science (Imai et al., 2023). It is used to estimate the causal effect of a binary treatment on a specific outcome while controlling for confounding variables. Matching aims at producing covariate balance, meaning that the distribution of covariates in the treatment and

⁵ These countries are: Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, France, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Israel, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom

control group are approximately equal, as they would be in a randomized experiment (Austin, 2011; Stuart, 2010). This increases the robustness of the estimates significantly and allows the identification of the ATT, the average treatment effect of the treated (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The treatment in this case is whether someone is a globalization loser or not, thus I use the ‘Globalization Loser 1/2’ variables as the treatment variables and specify separate models with both. To balance the sample, I rely on the following covariates: the parents’ highest level of education, the RTI score of the occupation, the income, respondents’ position on the left-right ideological scale, whether they are union members or not, and their gender and age. For robustness, I also create matched datasets that include the country and year variables in the balancing. The results based on these are presented in the Appendix. Using nearest-neighbor matching on propensity scores I allow for variable replacement as the treatment group is larger than the control group and without reusing control units I would not be able to identify the ATT, as I would need to drop treated units. Out of several matching specifications I tested, this one provided the greatest balance.

Figure 1.

Love Plot for Matching on ‘Globalization Loser 1’




Figure 2.

Love Plot for Matching on 'Globalization Loser 2'





Figure 1 plots the absolute standardized mean difference between the treatment and control groups before and after matching for the ‘Globalization Loser 1’ variable. Balance is considerably improved for all variables, apart from age. All variables other than age fall into the conventional bound of what is considered good balance as indicated by the dashed lines. The average propensity score difference, labeled as distance, is nonetheless basically 0. Figure 2 plots the same information but for the ‘Globalization Loser 2’ variable. Here all variables are significantly better balanced after matching and fall more or less into the bounds of what is considered good balance. The average propensity score difference is again very close to 0. In the Appendix, I also present density plots for the covariates before and after matching but these show a similar picture. To estimate the ATT, I fit logistic (for H1) and OLS (for H2) regressions to the matched datasets. Because I use matching with replacement, I need to account for control unit multiplicity and use robust standard errors. To facilitate the matching process and analysis I rely on the R package MatchIt (Ho et al., 2011) and its suggested workflow.

Results

Figure 3.


Offshorability over Different Levels of Education



To begin my analysis, I start by taking a descriptive look at the data. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of offshorability over the different levels of education. This shows that a lot of jobs are safe from offshoring as they only achieve a low score. This holds for all different levels of skill. A significantly smaller bump in the density can be observed between 50 and 75 on the offshorability scale. What this ridgeplot mainly illustrates is that offshorability and education are distinct concepts. One cannot say that low-skilled jobs are offshorable while high-skilled jobs are not, otherwise, we would observe different distribution patterns in the plot.

Figure 4.

Distribution of Income over 'Globalization Score'



While Figure 3 looked at the two variables that define how someone is affected by globalization, Figure 4 depicts the distribution of income over the four levels of the globalization score variable. Income is measured as the decile the respondents fall into on the overall income distribution in their country. The graph shows that many more people fall into categories 2 and 3, i.e. they are not strongly exposed to globalization risks. This makes sense considering Figure 3 where most jobs seem to have a low offshorability score. More importantly, Figure 4 illustrates that all income levels are present in the four categories of globalization exposure. While there seem to be some trends within the categories the main takeaway is that everyone can be affected by globalization, negatively or positively, regardless of their income.

Table 1.*Standard Regression Analysis*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	PRR Vote	Immigration Opinion
	<i>logistic</i> Model 1 (H1)	<i>OLS</i> Model 2 (H2)
Globalization Score	-0.238** (0.062)	0.261*** (0.027)
Parents' Education	-0.117*** (0.034)	0.142*** (0.014)
Left-Right Scale	0.803*** (0.024)	-0.328*** (0.009)
Satisfaction Economy	-0.044** (0.022)	0.205*** (0.009)
Gender (Female = 1)	-0.349*** (0.085)	0.179*** (0.039)
Age	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)
Income	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.038*** (0.008)
RTI	0.203*** (0.073)	-0.266*** (0.033)
Union (Member = 1)	-0.062 (0.105)	-0.014 (0.046)
Two-Way Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,162	11,825
Adjusted R ²		0.272
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,801.480	

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Lastly, I turn to the multivariate analysis of the hypotheses. Table 1 details the two regression models I run. Both include the two-way fixed effects, but their coefficients are omitted to improve readability. Model 1 tests the first hypothesis. ‘Globalization Score’ has the expected effect and is also statistically significant. This indicates that people who have a higher score are less likely to vote for PRR parties. Keeping in mind that lower scores indicate a more negative effect of globalization this means losers are more likely to vote for PRR parties. Model 2 aims at the second hypothesis. Again, the effect of ‘Globalization Score’ is in the expected direction and statistically significant. Those who score higher, i.e. those less negatively affected by globalization,

have a higher regard for immigrants and think they enrich their countries. I abstain from interpreting the control variables.

Table 2.

Regressions on the Matched Dataset

Model	Term	Estimate	SEs	Pr(> z)	2.5%	97.5%
M3 (RD, PRR Vote)	Globalization Loser 1	0.0608	0.0152	<0.001	0.0309	0.0906
M4 (Immigration)	Globalization Loser 1	-0.719	0.0876	<0.001	-0.891	-0.547
M5 (RD, PRR Vote)	Globalization Loser 2	0.0761	0.0177	<0.001	0.0415	0.111
M6 (Immigration)	Globalization Loser 2	-0.709	0.0000	<0.001	-0.709	-0.709

Table 2 presents the results from the analysis of the matched dataset. Models 3 and 4 use the ‘Globalization Loser 1’ variable as the treatment variable, while models 5 and 6 use ‘Globalization Loser 2’. The ATT estimates are presented as risk differences for models 3 and 5 as the outcome is binary. In essence, they can be interpreted as the difference in the probability that a treated subject will vote for a PRR party and the probability that a subject from the control group will vote for such a party. In both cases the estimate is positive, meaning globalization losers are more likely to vote for PRR parties. The results are also highly significant. Turning to models 4 and 6 a similar result emerges. The estimates are based on standard regression as the outcome is not binary anymore. They are in the expected direction in both cases, as they are negative. This means globalization losers hold a worse view of immigrants than globalization winners. Again, both estimates are statistically significant. Taking the results from the basic regression models and the ones run on the matched dataset it is safe to say that the hypotheses are supported.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have shown that globalization losers are more likely to vote for PRR parties than those who benefit economically from globalization. Losers also hold more negative views about immigration. To do so I have relied on standard regression and matching techniques to bolster the causal interpretation of my results. In my theoretical argument, I followed other scholars in assuming that globalization losers turn to ‘economic nationalism’. While my results confirm these expectations to some extent, they do not mean that all hope is lost for left parties. It might very well be the case that globalization losers would return to voting for left parties if strong social protection was expanded. This also seems to be the greatest question that emerges from this paper for scholars and politicians alike, especially if they are concerned about the rise of PRR parties. How can globalization losers be compensated effectively in times where expanding the welfare

state does not seem feasible and promises to do so have lost credibility, without resorting to chauvinistic and xenophobic ideas?

There are some limitations to the research presented in this paper that I want to point out. Firstly, the causal interpretation of the results should only happen with the utmost care as the balance achieved with the matching methods is far from perfect, even if it is a considerable improvement on the raw data. Another limitation is the focus on just one aspect of globalization, namely offshorability. There are many other aspects of globalization, for example, financial and cultural developments, that are likely to have some effect on individuals' attitudes and opinions. Thus, future research should try and look at these other aspects on the micro-level and not just on the macro-level. Lastly, I want to point out that my second hypothesis only covers part of the 'economic nationalism' explanation. Thus, the results should not be seen as full confirmation of this explanation. Rather future research should aim at testing the full causal chain and especially whether losers now prefer protectionism over social welfare expansion.

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Appendix

Table A1.

Regression Analysis with 'Globalization Loser 2'

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	PRR Vote	Immigration Opinion
	<i>logistic</i> Model A1 (H1)	<i>OLS</i> Model A2 (H2)
Globalization Loser 2	0.461* (0.265)	-0.531*** (0.101)
Parents' Education	-0.029 (0.080)	0.077** (0.032)
Left-Right Scale	0.970*** (0.065)	-0.352*** (0.020)
Satisfaction Economy	-0.114** (0.054)	0.170*** (0.021)
Female	-0.384* (0.207)	0.036 (0.089)
Age	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)
Income	0.060 (0.041)	-0.038** (0.017)
RTI	0.278 (0.195)	-0.320*** (0.084)
Union	-0.108 (0.250)	-0.156 (0.104)
Two-Way Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,588	2,386
Adjusted R ²		0.261
Akaike Inf. Crit.	735.857	

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2.

Density Plots after Matching on 'Globalization Loser 1'




Table A2.

Density Plots after Matching on 'Globalization Loser 2'





Table A3.*Regression after Matching with Country and Year as Covariates*

Model	Term	Estimate	SEs	Pr(> z)	2.5%	97.5%
A3 (RD, PRR Vote)	Globalization Loser 1	0.051	0.139	0.792	-0.327	0.429
A4 (Immigration)	Globalization Loser 1	-0.609	0.879	0.489	-2.33	1.11
A5 (RD, PRR Vote)	Globalization Loser 2	0.0455	0.0317	0.151	-0.016	0.108
A6 (Immigration)	Globalization Loser 2	-0.457	0.227	0.0438	-0.901	-0.012



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--

on the following topic

(topic / title of paper) <i>Globalization Losers' Switch from Left Parties to Populist Radical Right Parties</i>


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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'S. Örnitz', written inside a rectangular box.

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